A Word of Solidarity, A Call for Justice: A Statement on Religious Freedom in Eastern Europe an the Soviet Union by Authors, Unknown
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe
Volume 9 | Issue 4 Article 2
7-1989
A Word of Solidarity, A Call for Justice: A
Statement on Religious Freedom in Eastern Europe
an the Soviet Union
Unknown Authors
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree
Part of the Christianity Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional
Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University.
Recommended Citation
Authors, Unknown (1989) "A Word of Solidarity, A Call for Justice: A Statement on Religious Freedom in Eastern Europe an the
Soviet Union," Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 9: Iss. 4, Article 2.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol9/iss4/2
A WORD OF SOLIDARITY, A CALL FOR JUSTICE: 
A STATEMENT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN EASTERN EUROPE 
AND THE SOVIET UNION 
United States Catholic Conference 
November 17,  1988 
The Church in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union today is a church of many realities. 
There is the particularly tragic memory of Bishop Ernest Coba of Albania, murdered by 
prison authorities for celebrating a Mass with a few other inmates in his cell in contravention 
of prison regulations on Easter Day, 1979. In Czechoslovakia in 1988 there is the case of 
Augustin Navratil, a Catholic layman and father of nine, who has been involuntarily 
committed to a psychiatric clinic for responding to newspaper criticisms of his widely­
supported 3 1-point petition for religious rights. Then there is the young believer in the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR)(East Germany) who was denied admission to medical 
school because of her open profession of her faith. 
But there are also other, more hopeful, realities. There is the triumphant return of Pope 
John Paul II to his native Poland in 1979, the first visit by a pope to that country in its 
thousand year history and the first papal visit to any communist country. There is the image 
of 300,000 people gathered at the national eucharistic congress in Marija Bistrica, Yugoslavia 
in 1984, the largest religious gathering in Eastern Europe outside Poland since World War II; 
and there is the crowded weekday Mass in one of any number of parishes in Czechoslovakia, 
filled with believers practicing their faith despite the threat of discrimination in education 
and employment and innumerable other obstacles imposed by the present government. 
All of these realities and images - - and many, many more -- make up the complex 
picture of religious life in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union today. They form a picture 
of a church that has suffered and continues to suffer much from repression and restrictions, 
a modern reminder that "the Church was born on the Cross and grew up in the midst of 
persecutions."! They also present a picture of a vibrant church, with a long and rich 
heritage, which our Holy Father has attested "bears special witness to the fruitfulness of the 
meeting of the human spirit with the Christian mysteries and continues to exercise a 
salutary influence on the mind of the whole Church."2 
In writing this statement at this time, we seek to focus attention upon the situation of 
religion in these communist countries by reviewing in some detail the current situation of 
one religious body: the Catholic Church. We look at the situation of the Catholic Church 
within the framework of our concern for the protection of the religious liberty of all and 
our support for fundamental human rights and genuine peace in our own country and 
throughout the world. The Holy Father recently described this framework in this way: 
"In the first place, religious freedom, an essential requirement of the dignity of every 
person, is a cornerstone of the structure of human rights, and for this reason an 
irreplaceable factor in the good of individuals and of the whole of society, as well as 
of the personal fulfillment of each individual. It follows that the freedom of 
individuals and of communities to profess and practice their religion is an essential 
element for peaceful human coexistence. Peace, which is built up and consolidated 
at all levels of human association, puts down it roots in the freedom and openness of 
consciences to truth."3 
· 
In recent years we have spoken often on the moral imperative of safeguarding the 
fundamental right to religious liberty. We addressed the issue from a theoretical perspective 
in our 1980 pastoral letter on Marxist communism,4 and we specifically addressed the 
situation of the churches in Eastern Europe in our 1 977 statement, Religious Liberty in 
Eastern Europe: A Test Case for Human Rights,5 and in various other public statements.6 
Equally important, we have expressed our ecclesial solidarity with our brothers and sisters 
in Eastern Europe through personal visits, prayers and witness on their behalf. 
In 1988 we feel compelled once again to address the situation of believers in the 
communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It is appropriate as a final 
commemoration of several important anniversaries that have been observed in the past three 
years: the eleventh centenary of the evangelization of the Slavs settled in Great Moravia and 
Pannonia by Saints Cyril and Methodius (I 985), the SOOth anniversary of the 
Christianization of Latvia ( 1 986), the 600th anniversary of the Baptism of Lithuania ( 1 987), 
the 950th anniversary of the death of Hungary's founder and first king, St. Stephen, and the 
millennium of the adoption of Christianity in Kievan-Rus'(1 988).7 The very fact that these 
anniversaries have been celebrated throughout the world, including in Slovakia, Lithuania 
and Ukraine despite government interferences, is a tribute to the persistence, strength and 
dynamism of the churches in these regions. 
In addition to paying tribute to the rich traditions of the churches, it is particularly 
appropriate that we address their current status in light of recent developments in many of 
these communist countries. Much has happened in the past decade that has changed the 
dynamic of the situation in Eastern Europe, including the elevation of a Slavic pope, the 
emergence of independent movements, and the rise to power of new leadership in the 
Soviet Union and elsewhere. Yet much remains the same. The situation of the churches 
varies considerably from country to country -- reflecting the depth and variety of religious 
conviction among the people, and the degree of tenacity and pragmatism of the communist 
party leadership -- but a general pattern of intolerance of religion remains clearly evident. 
Therefore, as bishops, we feel an urgent need to focus attention once again on what the 
Holy Father has called the "radical injustice" of the. violation of religious freedom, to 
express our solidarity with our suffering brothers and sisters in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, to urge the structural reforms necessary for greater religious freedom for these 
brothers and sisters, and to highlight the urgency and efficacy of more concerted action by 
all Catholics, the governments of the world and others of good will in defending and 
promoting religious freedom in these countries. 
We focus here primarily on the situation of Catholics in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, but religious repression and intolerance are by no means directed only at Catholics 
or confined only to the countries examined in this statement. The difficulties faced by non­
Catholics in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and by some or all religions in Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Cuba, Iran, Turkey, Sudan and elsewhere also demand serious attention. This 
statement, while limited in scope, is meant to provide a case study of the continuing 
restrictions and sometimes outright repression that confront all religions, in varying ways 
and degrees, not only in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union bu.t in many countries 
throughout the world. We cannot overemphasize that the denial of religious liberty to one 
faith group or in one country is a threat to all faiths in all countries and must be the 
concern of all who value human rights. When Soviet Jews, Bulgarian Muslims, Vietnamese 
Buddhists or innumerable others suffer for their beliefs, we all suffer. As American 
Catholics, we share their suffering just as we share the duty to protect and promote, 
through our words and actions, religious freedom and tolerance wherever and whenever they 
are lacking. For this reason, we will continue to speak consistently on behalf of the rights 
of these groups and individuals and those of all faiths who suffer for their beliefs. 
I. Background: Principles and Practices 
A. Components of the Right of Religious Liberty: Catholic Teaching 
We seek to evaluate the extent of religious freedom in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union in light of the many dimensions of this fundamental human right.8 
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"In the first place," according to Pope John Paul II, "religious freedom is an essential 
requirement of the dignity of every person and . . .  a cornerstone of the structure of human 
rights."9 Religious liberty is unique among the many essential requirements of human 
dignity because its object is an individual's relationship with God, the ultimate end of the 
human person. As a social and civil right, it has both a personal dimension -- the freedom 
of conscience -- and a social dimension -- the free exercise of religion. 
1 .  Freedom of conscience is the aspect of the right of religious liberty which requires 
that each person be free from all external coercion in his or her search for God, religious 
truth and faith. It is the freedom to make a personal religious decision. It requires, among 
other things, that believers be treated equally with other citizens and not be discriminated 
against in economic, social, political or cultural life; and that educational programs, the 
media and government policies respect religious beliefs and not attempt to undermine or 
destroy them. Because human nature is both personal and social, religious faith is expressed 
in outward acts and within a community of faith. Hence, freedom of conscience is directly 
tied to the social dimension of religious liberty: the free exercise of religion. 
2. The free exercise of religion involves a two-fold immunity. In the words of the 
Second Vatican Council, this means that all "are to be immune from coercion on the part of 
individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that in matters 
religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs. Nor is 
a.nyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs, whether privately 
or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits." lO There are 
three distinct but interrelated aspects to this freedom to exercise one's religion: freedom of 
religious expression and evangelization, ecclesial freedom and freedom of religious 
association. 
a. Freedom of religious expression and evangelization affirms that individuals and 
religious bodies are to be free from coercion in public worship and public religious 
observances and practices. It also requires freedom to publish and import bibles and other 
religious literature; the freedom to have social communications media and access to public 
communications; the freedom to teach publicly and witness to the faith; and the freedom to 
address the religious and moral dimensions of social, economic and political questions. It also 
includes the rights of parents to determine the kind of religious education that their children 
are to receive, and to avoid education for their children that is not in conformity with their 
religious beliefs. 
b. Ecclesial or institutional freedom is the corporate right of religious organizations to 
internal autonomy, that is, to control the many dimensions of church life. This autonomy 
requires the freedom to develop and teach doctrine, the freedom to choose and train 
ministers in their own institutions and to appoint and transfer these ministers without 
external interference, and the freedom to construct and use buildings for religious needs 
and to obtain other materials necessary for the church's life. 
c. Freedom of religious association affirms the freedom of a person to enter or leave a 
community of faith; the freedom to form religious groups for educational, cultural, 
charitable or social purposes; the freedom to assemble to engage in religious pilgrimages; and 
the freedom to communicate freely with co-religionists at home and abroad. 
This brief summary of the many essential components of religious liberty provides the 
criteria by which we seek to judge the current situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. The claims of some governments notwithstanding, it is clear from this summary 
that freedom of conscience and freedom of worship alone do not constitute freedom of 
religion. 
It is also clear from this summary that the right to religious liberty is inextricably 
connected to other legal rights and protections, most notably, freedom of conscience, 
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association and speech, equality before the law, and legal recognition of independent 
entities. If a state limits or denies the right to full religious freedom, it almost certainly will 
limit or deny these other rights as well. In this sense, the civil and social right to religious 
liberty is a point of reference and a measure of other fundamental rights. II In fact, Pope 
John Paul II reminds us in his recent encyclical, On Social Concern (Sollicitudo Rei Socialis), 
that the lack of religious liberty is one index of poverty and underdevelopment: 
The denial or limitation of human rights -- as for example the right to religious 
freedom, the right to share in the building of society, the freedom to organize and 
to form unions or to take initiatives in economic matters -- do these not impoverish 
the human person as much as, if not more than, the deprivation of material goods? 
And is development which does not take into account the full affirmation of these 
rights really development on the human level? 1 2  (emphasis added) 
Given the fundamental importance of the right involved, we are specially committed to 
those whose religious freedom is suppressed or limited, not for the purpose of being 
polemical or adversarial, but in order to enable all persons to share in and contribute to the 
common good. Human dignity and the common good demand religious liberty. 
B. Religious Repression and Intolerance in Eastern Europe and the USSR: An Overview 
The present situation of religious liberty in Eastern Europe can only be understood in 
light of complex historical, cultural, religious and political factors unique to each country. 
Most Eastern European states have suffered many centuries of foreign domination, and few 
have a recent tradition of religious or political freedom or tolerance. The Latin Catholic and 
Orthodox churches have been dominant -- except in the German Democratic Republic 
(where the Protestant Church has been in the majority) and Albania (where Islam 
predominates) -- and often were closely aligned with the state. Moreover, nationalism and 
religion have long been closely linked in Eastern Europe, sometimes creating divisions 
among Christians, but in other cases engendering a vital sense of cultural, social and 
political identity that continues to have far-reaching consequences. 
Clearly, some of these factors have facilitated the communist persecution of religion; 
others help to explain the widely divergent situation of the churches in the Soviet-bloc 
countries. However, it is the abiding ideological hostility to religion common to all 
communist regimes that has most significantly defined the present situation. In our 1980 
pastoral letter on Marxist communism, we noted certain variants in Marxist theory and 
practice, which include questions of religion.I3 Despite these variants, a�l communist 
movements are grounded in a "scientific atheism" that rejects, not only the Christian vision 
of the person, society, history and morality, but the very idea of religion itself. The 
scientific atheism of Marxism-Leninism regards religion as a distortion of reality, an 
illusion: which manifests social and economic conditions that impede the realization of a 
socialist society. Lenin regarded religion as a poison, deliberately administered for sinister 
social purposes by the bourgeois class. As an antidote to this poison, he advocated 
indoctrination in scientific atheism in conjunction with severe restrictions on religion until 
it inevitably withered away under new social and economic conditions. 
This ideological antagonism toward religion has translated into a long history of 
persecution of religion by communist governments, first in the Soviet Union and later 
throughout Eastern Europe. The scale of persecution has been and remains sustained and 
comprehensive, and its roster of victims all inclusive: Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, 
Jews, Muslims, Jehovah's Witnesses, and many others. 
As sustained and comprehensive as this persecution of religion has been and is, its 
particular form has varied widely over time and place, depending upon the strength of the 
churches, strategic considerations of the governments and other factors. In general, the 
policies of communist governments have followed three approaches, reflecting differing 
judgments as to the methods by and pace at which religion can or should be suppressed: (i) 
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an all-out assault on religion; (ii) a containment of religion through strict administrative 
controls; and (iii) a form of coexistence with religion, which accommodates religious 
institutions -- within well-defined limits -- for the sake of national interests. l 4  
1. Outright repression 
The first approach to religion -- which was most prevalent during the Stalin period but 
continues in some areas today -- calls for an all-out assault on religion as a reactionary 
threat to the communist state and an obstacle to social and economic progress. This all-out 
assault includes in its most severe form the outright prohibition of all religious activities -
- as is found in Albania -- or entire denominations -- as is the case with the Eastern 
Catholic Church in Ukraine and Romania, and the Jehovah's Witnesses in Czechoslovakia 
and the Soviet Union. l 5  It includes the confiscation of church property, and the exile, 
imprisonment or murder of bishops, priests and lay leaders. These repressive measures are 
augmented by intensive atheistic indoctrination, bitter anti-religious propaganda campaigns, 
and officially-sanctioned discrimination against religious believers. 
2. Containment through administrative measures 
Under this second approach -- which is the most typical today in the Soviet-bloc -­
religion is seen as a deeply rooted historical, cultural, social and political force that must be 
tolerated, at least in the short-term, but only within strictly-defined limits. Through law and 
administrative norms and practices, the government attempts to limit religious liberty, in all 
relevant respects, to freedom of worship. The Soviet Constitution is typical. It states: 
Citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed freedom of conscience, that is, the right to 
profess or not to profess any religion, and to conduct religious worship or atheist 
propaganda. Incitement of hostility or hatred on religious grounds is prohibited. In 
the U.S.S.R. the church is separate from the State, and the school from the, church. l 6  
This and other constitutional and statutory provisions are combined with extensive 
administrative regulations of "religious cults" to constrain severely religious activity. State 
registration of all religious groups is used to deny legal status to some groups. Once 
registered, churches face strict regulations which, in most cases, prohibit formal religious 
education for children, parish associations or study groups, charitable activities, most or all 
religious publications, religious orders and evangelization. 
The few aspects of religious life that are not banned are often subverted through state 
control or co-optation of all important aspects of church organization, including 
appointments, finances, training of clergy, publishing, opening or closing of churches, and 
the like. All but the most ordinary day-to-day activities of the religious communities 
require state approval, and the decisions of government authorities are often arbitrary, 
guided by political expediency or based on regulations that are not even published. Those 
who actively oppose or circumvent these administrative controls or are involved in religious 
activities deemed to be "anti-state" are subject to fines, searches, arrest, imprisonment, 
intimidation, harassment and beatings. 
As in the first model, these strict controls are reinforced by active discrimination against 
believers in education and employment, persistent anti-religious propaganda, and pervasive 
atheistic indoctrination through the schools, the media and various other means, not the least 
of which are the state-sponsored ceremonies, such as the Jugendweihe (Youth Dedication) 
in the German Democratic Republic, which are designed as atheistic substitutes for 
confirmation and other religious rites. 
3. Coexistence and l imited accommodation 
This third approach is more accepting of religion as a fact of life that must be tolerated 
and that actually can have, within certain limits, a positive role in furthering national 
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interests. This model suggests the possibility of a more open relationship between church 
and state than the other two models. What distinguishes this approach is that it allows 
considerably more religious activity than just freedom of worship. The churches -- most 
notably in Yugoslavia and Poland -- are relatively free to manage their internal affairs 
without significant state interference and control and they have a certain degree of freedom 
of religious association and expression. The Church is able to choose its own bishops and 
clergy and to run its seminaries without significant government interference, and religious 
orders are permitted. The religious press is more likely to offer a credible independent 
voice, bibles and other religious literature are generally available, contacts with co­
religionists abroad are extensive and unhindered, and large-scale religious gatherings are 
permitted. The churches are permitted to operate secondary schools and, in Poland, a 
university, and formal religious education of children is allowed at the parish level and in 
the home. The churches also maintain rather extensive charitable activities, although they 
are limited in scope, for the most part, to work in hospitals, orphanages, and senior citizen 
centers. 
The churches still suffer under this approach from some of the significant restrictions 
found in the second model, however, including the prohibition of church-affiliated primary 
schools, state- and self-censorship -- though usually to a lesser extent -- of religious 
publications, government-imposed limits on newsprint and printing equipment, and, with 
few exceptions, a lack of access to radio or television. Perhaps most importantly, religious 
believers face discrimination, anti-religious propaganda and atheistic indoctrination similar 
to that found in the previous two models. Finally, with certain exceptions, the churches are 
limited in their ability to criticize publicly government policies, and face considerable 
pressure strongly to endorse these policies. 
Clearly, no Eastern European government's policy toward religion fits neatly into one 
of these three categories. The policies of these governments have changed over time and 
often depend on which denomination or national group is involved. Most governments 
follow a combination of these approaches, though one approach often dominates policy and 
practice at a particular time. Recognizing these important qualifications, some general 
observations about the approach to the Catholic Church are possible: Albanian policy and 
the Soviet and Romanian policies toward the Eastern Catholic Church most closely represent 
the first model; the general religious policies of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria 
and Romania fall under the second model; the Hungarian approach is a hybrid of the second 
and third models; and the German Democratic Republic, Polish and Yugoslav policies 
roughly correspond to the third approach. 
These distinctions, while not always clear-cut, are important because the approach that 
is followed has enormous significance for the degree of religious freedom the churches 
retain. But, except for Albania -- which is unique in that it prohibits all religion, the 
differences, however significant, are differences of degree not quality. The extentof denial 
of · religious liberty may vary widely between countries, but the fact remains that the 
policies of all these governments are rooted in an ideological hostility toward religion and 
are designed to restrict religious freedom in morally unacceptable ways. 
The churches have defended themselves against this hostility and these restrictions in a 
variety of ways which reflect ecclesiological, cultural and political differences. In some 
cases, prohibited activities have been continued in secret; in others, believers have directly 
confronted the government, usually with harsh consequences. Many religious bodies have 
pursued a nonconfrontational approach, seeking a practical compromise with the state in an 
effort to prevent further limitations on their activities. In a relatively few cases, some 
individuals have collaborated with or become virtually subservient to the state. Since Pope 
John XXIII, the Holy See has pursued political agreements with various Eastern European 
governments as part of a long-range strategy to win by small steps at least a measure of 
religious freedom for the Church. While some might disagree with the particular response 
of individuals or churches to religious persecution, those of us who are not directly 
confronted with their difficult choices should be slow to judge the many different ways that 
believers have chosen to respond in faith to a very difficult situation. 
6 
In order to illustrate the spectrum of church-state relations in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union , it might be useful to look briefly at the situation in each of the nine countries. 
We do riot attempt an exhaustive analysis of the complex factors at work here, but simply 
offer an overview of the present situation of the Catholic Church, as a modest case study 
of church-state relations in these countries. l 7  
II. Religious Repression and Intolerance: A Closer Look 
Soviet Union 
As with many other government policies, the Soviet Union's approach to religion has 
served as the model for the whole of Eastern Europe. This approach has alternated between 
attempts to destroy religious institutions through outright persecution and the more subtle, 
but still very damaging, efforts to constrain religion to worship alone through strict 
administrative controls. 
After years of oppression under the Czars, the Catholic Church in the Soviet Union has 
been repressed systematically under communist rule. l 8  The majority Russian Orthodox 
Church and all religious institutions have also suffered greatly under communism. The 
government has been especially hostile to the Catholic Church because it has served as a 
focus for the development of a distinct national and cultural identity, especially in the Baltic 
States, western Ukraine and western Byelorussia. 
The Baltic State 
After a period of independence between the world wars, the Baltic States -- Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia -- were forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, an action not 
recognized by the Vatican, the United States, and 32 other states to this day. l9  
Lithuania i s  tqe only republic in the Soviet Union that i s  predominantly Latin 
Catholic;20 after 44 years of continuous Soviet occupation, some three-fourths of the 3.3 
million people remain practicing Catholics.2 1 During these years, the Catholic Church has 
been a bulwark against Soviet attempts to repress and eradicate the religious, cultural and 
political expression of Lithuanian identity. Six centuries after the Christianization of 
Lithuania, the Church remains relatively strong and unified despite over a century of 
oppression under the Czars, and almost five decades of overt attacks, strict controls and 
pervasive atheistic propaganda under Soviet communism. 
The Church's situation has improved slightly in recent years with progress towards 
regularizing and strengthening the Church's hierarchy, including the recent appointment of 
Cardinal Vincentas Sladkevicius of Kaisiadorys, the first known Lithuanian cardinal in 
modern times; with a three-fold increase since 1973 in the number of students allowed to 
enroll at the lone seminary in Kaunas; with the publication, in token quantities, of the 
documents of Vatican II, a new translation of the New Testament, portions of the Latin 
Catholic Sacramentary and Lectionary, a few prayer books and catechisms, a modest 
Catholic almanac, and one or two other publications; and with the promise to return the 
Cathedral and the Church of St. Casimir in the capital city of Vilnius, and the Queeen of 
Peace Church in Klaipeda. 
Since 1972, an organized protest movement with its own underground journals, the most 
notable being The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania, has helped galvanize 
widespread opposition to religious repression in Lithuania and has focused international 
attention on the Church's plight. The Soviet authorities have reacted harshly to the growth 
of this movement by harassing, intimidating, imprisoning and confining to psychiatric 
hospitals leaders -- including several priests -- of the Chronicle, the Lithuanian Helsinki 
Group, the Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights and other groups 
concerned with basic human rights. Others have been assaulted or have died under 
suspicious circumstances. 
This harsh reaction to religious protests may have diminished somewhat with the 
emergence of glasnost and perestroika, but surveillance and intimidation of religious 
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dissenters continue, as do the more subtle but no less damaging restrictions on the Church. 
A state-induced shortage of priests; the government's refusal to allow Bishop Julijonas 
Steponavicius to function as apostolic administrator of the Archdiocese of Vilnius; the ban 
on religious education of children, charitable activities, all religious orders, and most 
religious publications; and increasingly sophisticated anti-religious propaganda prevent the 
Church from exercising even its most basic religious functions. 
In sum, the situation of the Church brings to mind, "the image of the Hill of Crosses 
which has · grown up in Lithuania: thousands of crosses, witnessing the suffering and the 
hope of the entire nation, which has been able to preserve its faith even in the most painful 
hours of trial."22 
Unlike in Lithuania, the Catholic Church in Latvia is a minority church (about 20% of 
the population) but it is stable and has been growing in strength and influence in the last 
few years, buttressed by the naming of the first known cardinal in the Soviet Union, 
Cardinal Julijans Vaivods, in 1 983. The Latvian Church faces the same constraints as its 
counterpart in Lithuania but, as in Lithuania, some minor concessions have been won in 
recent years: the number of seminarians at the seminary in Riga -- one of only two 
Catholic seminaries in the Soviet Union -- has more than doubled (to about 65) in the past 
decade; a lectionary and catechism have been published; and two new bishops have been 
named since 1 982. 
Ukraine 
The celebration of the millennium of the conversion of St. Vladimir and the introduction 
of Christianity into Kievan-Rus' is seriously marred by the fact that the Eastern Catholic 
Church in Ukraine remains illegal.23 Since it was abolished and forcibly merged with the 
Russian Orthodox Church in 1 946, a large underground church (estimates range from three 
to six million faithful) has developed -- though its existence and legitimacy are denied by 
Soviet authorities. Although verifiable statistics are unavailable, there are as  many as 
eighteen bishops and perhaps a thousand priests functioning without government permission 
in Ukraine. Inspired by the election of Pope John Paul II, the advent of glasnost and the 
millennium, an organized human rights movement has emerged among believers since 1982 
and the underground church has become more visible in its call for legalization. The Soviet 
authorities have responded by denying all requests for recognition, arresting or harassing 
numerous priests, and embarking on a massive propaganda campaign against "religious 
nationalism" in Ukraine. 
We are encouraged by the start of formal discussions between the Catholic Church and 
the Orthodox Church on the status of Ukrainian Catholics (as well as other Eastern 
Catholics) .  We join with Pope John Paul II in urging that the great numbers of faithful of 
this·repressed Church be permitted to "enjoy true freedom of conscience and respect for 
their religious right to give public worship to God according to many different traditions 
in their own rite and with their own pastors."24 As our Holy Father has said, "Membership 
in the Catholic Church should not be considered by some as incompatible with the good of 
one's own earthly country and with the inheritance of St. Vladimir."25 
In addition to the Latin Catholics in Lithuania and Latvia, and the Eastern Catholics in 
Ukraine, at least 4 million Latin Catholic,:s are found in western parts of Byelorussia and 
Ukraine (i.e., in the former Polish territories which after the Second World War passed under 
the control of the Soviet Union) and other Soviet Republics.26 The Church in these areas 
is forced to operate with relatively few parishes, fewer priests and no resident bishops. 
Perestroika, Glasnost and Religion 
There is little doubt that General Secretary Gorbachev's perestroika (restructuring) and 
glasnost (openness) have ushered in a new political climate and a process of reform that, if 
successful, would bring about significant and necessary change in Soviet economic, political 
and cultural life.27 It is much less clear whether there also would be significant 
improvement in the government's approach to religion. We welcome the tentative moves 
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toward a relaxation of the strict controls on religion. More bibles are being printed and 
imported, some church buildings have been returned, a number of religious prisoners have 
been released or allowed to emigrate, steps have been taken to improve dialogue between 
religious leaders and state officials, there has been a fuller and more frank treatment of 
religion in the official media, there have been official admissions of past and present abuses 
of the rights of believers, a few experiments in establishing religious charities have been 
allowed, and some previously illegal religious bodies have been registered. Believers have 
also benefited from the greater freedom of expression and association brought by glasnost. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether General Secretary Gorbachev's reforms will 
include fundamental changes in religious policies comparable to those announced for other 
areas of Soviet life. The promises to release all prisoners of conscience, to reopen more 
churches and, most importantly, to revise the 1929 law regulating religious bodies and other 
laws affecting believers have raised hopes and expectatio'ns that the current process of 
reform, in fact, will include greater tolerance of religion. The fulfillment of these promises 
would be cause for hope. Other necessary signs of true improvements in the state's policy 
toward religion would include: 
* legalization of the Eastern Catholic Church in Ukraine and other churches that have 
been banned and restoration of their property; 
* recognition of religious bodies as legal entities; 
* an end to the anti-religious campaign in the official press, discrimination against 
believers, and interference in the selection of bishops and the training and appointment of 
priests; 
* a lifting of the ban on educational, charitable, cultural and social activities, and on 
formal religious education of children, youth and adults; 
* a guarantee of the right to travel abroad and to emigrate; and 
* publication and public review of all decrees and instructions governing the regulation 
of religious bodies. 
Structural reforms of this type would be important indicators of the nature and direction of 
glasnost and perestroika.28 
It is still less clear whether other communist governments in Eastern Europe will reform 
their religious policies. The significant differences between these countries' policies 
regarding atheistic propaganda and the regulation of religion indicate that religious policy 
in this region is not monolithic. While the Soviet model has been applied throughout 
Eastern Europe, countries such as Poland and Yugoslavia have adapted it to their own 
situations in ways that allow the churches considerably more latitude than in the Soviet 
Union. In countries such as Albania, on the other hand, the Soviet model has assumed an 
unprecedented severity. Differences in the strength and approach of the communist party 
leadership, historical and cultural factors, and the vitality of religion help account for these 
varied approaches; they do not, however, justify the ideological and structural intolerance 
of religion which is at the heart of the policies of all of these governments. 
Albania 
Christianity in Albania dates from the first century preaching of Saints Paul and 
Andrew. Today, this ancient Church suffers from religious persecution unprecedented in 
modern times.29 After years of religious persecution, all religion was formally abolished 
by government decree in 1967, when 2,200 mosques, churches and other religious buildings 
were closed and religious leaders were imprisoned or executed, leading dictator Enver 
Hoxha to boast that Albania was "the first atheist state in the world." Albania is the only 
country in the world where the suppression of all religious belief and practice is 
constitutionally mandated. Since 1979 ,  any religious activity is punishable by imprisonment 
without trial. Albania is also the only country in Eastern Europe that has not signed the 
Helsinki Accords or any other international human rights convention. Albania remains a 
member of the United Nations, however, despite its explicit rejection of the principles of 
the U.N. Charter. 
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All three religious traditions -- Muslim (68%), Orthodox ( 1 9%), Catholic ( 1 0%) -- have 
been devastated by the communist persecution, but the harshest repression has been directed 
against the Catholic Church. Between 1 945 and 1 98 1 ,  1 37  Catholic clergy were executed or 
died in prison. The persecution continues unabated. Bishop Ernest Coba was killed in 1 979 
for saying Mass in secret. The one remaining prelate, Bishop Nikoll Troshani, is detained 
in labor camp, as are the few remaining priests. In recent years, priests have been executed 
for baptizing children, believers have been given jail sentences of twelve years for 
possessing Bibles and eight years for having a child baptized. Despite these hardships, even 
the government has admitted that religion endures, as people continue to follow religious 
rituals, pray and read scriptures secretly. 
We pledge our solidarity with this Church which continues to suffer in silence, and we 
pray that the Albanian government soon will realize that faith cannot be. eliminated by 
government decree and that religious persecution must come to an end. ' · 
Bulgaria 
The situation of the Church in Bulgaria is also very serious.30 Religious activity is at 
a far lower ebb than in any other Eastern European country except Albania. Bulgaria 
experienced especially severe repression of religion in the early 1 950s. Since the 1970s, 
government policy toward religion in general has been relaxed somewhat, but Muslims have 
been singled out for severe repression because of their beliefs and their Turkish roots. 
The majority Orthodox Church is the only religious group that is free to train its clergy 
in its own seminary, print books and own land. Religious education and evangelization by 
any church are banned, and young people are discouraged from attending worship services. 
The state even has gone so far as to offer cash incentives to those who participate in 
substitute secular ceremonies. Bibles and other religious literature remain almost impossible 
to obtain. 
The Catholic Church in Bulgaria consists of Latin (two dioceses) and Eastern (one 
diocese) Catholics; about sixty thousand faithful served by about thirty priests. The Church 
was severely persecuted between 1 948 and 1 952. It continues to experience difficulties with 
the appointment of bishops (the Sofia-Plovdiv see was vacant from 1983-88) and the training 
of priests (Catholic seminaries remain closed; only recently did. the government sanction the 
ordination of three priests annually). The government also has renewed efforts to prevent 
religious education of children under age 1 6. One of the few positive developments has 
been a partial lifting of the virtual isolation of Bulgarian Catholics from the outside world. 
Since 1 978, a small number of Catholics have been allowed to make religious pilgrimages 
and study abroad. 
The Bulgarian Church seeks the freedom to appoint bishops and to train priests without 
state interference, and to provide religious instruction to Catholics of all ages. Such freedom 
would threaten no one and would contribute to revitilizing this venerable church. 
Czechoslovakia 
In 1 987, Pope John Paul described the Church's status in Czechoslovakia as a "sad 
situation with no analogy in countries of Christian tradition."3 1 While most Eastern 
European countries have refrained from overt attacks on the churches since the 1 950s, since 
1 968 the Czechoslovak government has reintroduced an increasingly harsh policy toward 
religion that remains in place, and may have intensified, in the 1 980s.32 
In a country with a large Catholic majority, ten of the thirteen dioceses have been 
without a resident bishop for decades due to the state's refusal to accept the Vatican's 
appointments (three Vatican appointments, two auxiliaries and an apostolic administrator, 
were finally accepted in 1 988, the first in fifteen years). State restrictions on admissions at 
the two remaining seminaries (there were 1 3  in 1 945) and state control over ministerial 
licenses (more than 500 priests have been deprived of their licenses) have left one-quarter 
of the parishe.s without a priest. A government-sponsored priests' association, Pacem in 
Terris, has been condemned by the Vatican and Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek of Prague for 
1 0  
its pro-government political activities. Religious orders of men have been illegal since 1 950 
while orders of women have been prohibited from accepting new novices since 1971 and, 
with a few recent exceptions, are allowed to work only in homes for senior citizens and 
centers for the incurably sick and handicapped. The government also has made it virtually 
impossible to build new churches and has restricted severely contacts with the Church 
outside Czechoslovakia. As in the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, believers suffer from 
prohibition of most religious activity and face sustained atheistic propaganda and serious 
discrimination in education and employment as a result of worshipping openly. 
These government policies have been applied with particular severity against Eastern 
Catholics, who have borne the heavy cross of oppression. The Eastern Catholic Church was 
forcibly incorporated into the Orthodox Church after World War II. In the portion of 
Czechoslovakia that was annexed to the Soviet Union (Carpato-Ruthenia), the Church 
continues to operate underground with priests and bishops. · The remaining diocese in 
Slovakia was restored in 1 968 but remains without bishops and continues to be oppressed in 
countless ways. 
Despite these and similar policies, the 1 980s have brought a strong religious revival in 
Czechoslovakia, especially among the young, in some of the traditionally more secularized 
urban areas and in heavily Catholic Slovakia.33 This revival is evidenced by several large 
pilgrimages in recent years and high levels of daily Mass attendance. In 1 987 and 1988 this 
revitilized Church, led by Cardinal Tomasek and some other bishops, has been clear and 
unified in its articulation of the pressing need for new, more open policies towards religion. 
We support the aspirations of the Catholics in Czechoslovakia, as outlined in their 3 1 -point 
Charter of Believers, for an end to discrimination against believers and state interference 
with Catholic seminaries and the appointment of priests. In demanding restoration of the 
religious orders, construction of new churches, ordination of new bishops, freedom to receive 
and publish religious materials, and the right to form Catholic associations, Czech and 
Slovak Catholics seek no privileges but only the ability to live their faith and contribute to 
the common good. The recognition of these legitimate demands combined with the success 
of the recently-announced ten year plan for spiritual renewal would do much to heal the 
scars of the past, bring about reconciliation and strengthen the moral fabric of society. 
German Democratic Republic 
The religious situation in the GDR differs from that of the Soviet Union, Albania, 
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia insofar as the major religious bodies retain a greater degree of 
independence in internal church affairs.34 The crass anti-religious propaganda and 
harassment campaigns against clergy and church leaders that aggravate church-state tensions 
in these other countries have been abandoned, for the most part, in the GDR. The Socialist 
Unity Party (SED) has sought a relationship based on dialogue while allowing the churches 
a certain limited freedom of action. 
Given its minority status (about 8% of the population) and a desire to maintain its 
distance from the communist government, the Catholic Church's relationship with the state 
has been somewhat strained. The Church has criticized discrimination against Christian 
youth in education and employment (including the 'youth dedication' ritual for fourteen­
year-olds), protested the introduction of pre-military training in the schools and the 
militarization of society generally, and, most significantly, has condemned the continuing 
atheistic education that has accelerated the secularization of society. Only in 1 987 was the 
Church allowed to hold a national convocation, the first since World War II and a most 
significant event for the Church. 
It is the state's monopolization of youth, its ideological threat and the virtual impossibility 
for practicing Christians to have access to higher studies and public offices, rather than the 
direct attacks and subversion of the church common in some other Eastern European 
countries, that impede improvement in c.hurch-state relations in the GDR. As Cardinal 
Joachim Meisner has said, Christians seek only the ability to live their faith and to "assume 
their social responsibility, in full accord with their conscience oriented by the faith of the 
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church."35 Christians desire to lend their talents to society "without thereby following any 
star other than that of Bethlehem."36 
Hungary 
The Hungarian government's willingness to compromise on a limited basis regarding 
church-state questions and a generally nonconfrontational approach by the Catholic Church 
{about 60% of the population) and the Reformed and Lutheran churches (about 20% of the 
population) have combined to ensure believers in Hungary a degree of religious freedom in 
certain areas of church life that is not found in some other Eastern European countries.37 
Hungary is distinguished from the more repressive regimes by the limited number of 
Catholic religious orders which are permitted to operate eight secondary schools, the filling 
of vacanCies in episcopal sees with less rigid state interference, the general availability of 
Bibles and other religious materials, and the broadcast of religious programs by the state 
radio every Sunday. In the past decade private religious meetings have been largely 
tolerated, the study of the Bible as literature has been introduced into state secondary 
schools, a retreat house for lay people has been opened, and the state has permitted the 
establishment of a religious women's community dedicated to medical and social services. 
No doubt the Church has benefited from some loosening of restrictions on it, but, as 
certain Hungarian bishops have indicated, more fundamental changes are necessary. It has 
been suggested that it is necessary to rethink the present legal framework for Church-state 
relations, in a spirit of cooperation and out of a desire to contribute to Hungarian society.38 
Specifically, the bishops have requested an end to the bureaucratic restrictions on religious 
instruction; a free hand for involvement with young people; rehabilitation of the religious 
orders, associations and publications that were dissolved during the Stalin era; an expansion 
of the eight high schools to accommodate unmet demand; greater access to the media; the 
right for priests to visit freely hospitals, prisons and schools; and a reconsideration of the 
government's policy toward Catholic conscientious objectors. These kinds of reforms could 
contribute to the creation of a new structure for church-state relations in Hungary. 
Poland 
Since the consolidation of communist rule in Eastern Europe after World War II, the 
Catholic Church in Poland has been the strongest and one of the most dynamic in the region 
-- in part because of its size, its identification with Polish national aspirations, its strong 
moral leadership and its role as the major independent institution in the country.39 The 
election of Pope John Paul II in 1978 seems to have only increased the strength of an already 
vital Church. 
The Church's remarkable resilience is most evident in its success in maintaining a 
significant degree of religious freedom despite the government's persistent efforts to 
suppress it. Both in law and in fact Polish citizens enjoy considerable freedom to practice 
their religion. Although the church still lacks legal status, the government has had to 
respect, for the most part, her institutional integrity. Unlike many other Eastern European 
countries, Polish law allows religious education in the home and in the churches. The 
Catholic Church operates the only independent university in Eastern Europe, numerous 
independent theological institutes and seminaries, several high schools and an extensive 
catechetical program. Church publications and the Catholic press offer a credible 
independent voice. The Church also is allowed limited charitable activities, and some lay 
organizations and movements, such as the Catholic Intellectuals' Club and Oases, are 
permitted to operate at the local level.40 The Church has retained ownership of much of 
its property and has embarked in the past few years on a vigorous building program. 
Finally, the number of clergy and religious has more than doubled since 1945 and Poland 
remains one of the few countries in Europe where religious vocations are on the increase. 
This relative freedom should not obscure the need, often expressed by the Polish 
Bishops, for important changes in state policies. State officials intimidate parents and their 
children who want to enroll in the optional catechetical programs. More importantly, the 
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religious education of children and young people is threatened by secular programs and what 
the Polish bishops in 1 986 termed a campaign of "intense atheistic propaganda" in the state 
schools.4 1 Religious publications, though relatively independent, have limited circulation 
and are subject to governmental censorship; and churches have no access to state-controlled 
radio and television other than the weekly radio broadcasts of religious services. The state 
continues to refuse legal status to the Church and lay Catholic associations, and the 
government consistently has encouraged anti-Church propaganda. 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Polish case is the way in which the Church's 
strength and relative freedom have enabled it to serve as a defender of and advocate for 
other human rights and to contribute positively to the common good. It has played a 
courageous and pivotal role in the crisis brought about by the government's imposition of 
martial law and its attempts to crush Solidarity, and in subsequent efforts to stabilize the 
social, economic and political situation. It has supported the human and social ideals 
expressed by Solidarity, opposed martial law and demanded legal recognition of various 
civil, cultural and political rights as part of its call for far-sighted transformations in the 
economic and political system. At the same time that it has spoken on behalf of social 
justice, the Church has assumed the role of mediator, encouraging steady, nonviolent 
change in an effort to foster national unity. 
Romania 
As in Poland, religious practice is very strong in Romania and has similarly close ties to 
nationalistic feelings and culture, but the government's religious policies are much 
harsher.42 As in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, most religious activities 
other than worship are virtually banned, and the state exercises strict control over the 
churches. The government has settled, by necessity, for a form of co-existence with the 
majority Orthodox Church. But it has severely suppressed the Eastern Catholic Church ( 1 .8 
million adherents), which was banned and forcibly integrated into the Orthodox Church in 
1948 .  Latin Catholics ( 1 .2 million) have also suffered because the government has considered 
them a threat to national unity due to their primarily German and Hungarian origins and 
their loyalty to Rome. The five Latin Catholic dioceses have been effectively reduced to 
two due to difficulties in appointing bishops, the orders and religious congregations have 
been suppressed, the training of priests is highly restricted and the Church, as such, is not 
recognized by the state. Appeals by believers seeking the most basic of religious freedoms 
have been ignored or suppressed. Discrimination against believers, especially ethnic 
Hungarians and members of other minority groups, is increasing and the state frequently 
attacks religion through the media and the schools. 
In recent years the Church has won small concessions from the government. The 
Bucharest Archdiocese has a bishop for the first time since 1954 and pilgrims have travelled 
to Rome for the first time since World War II. The very modest nature of these concessions 
is indicative of the difficulties faced by our Romanian brothers and sisters and the urgency 
and legitimacy of their desire for greater freedom to live fully their faith. 
Yugoslavia 
Since the Belgrade Protocol of 1 966, which formalized relations between the Holy See 
and the Yugoslav government (Yugoslavia is the only Eastern European country with which 
the Holy See maintains formal diplomatic relations), the Catholic Church has maintained 
a considerable degree of freedom from state interference in internal church administration 
. and has taken an active role in national life despite continued strong pressure from the 
government.43 
The almost seven million Catholics in Yugoslavia (found mostly in Croatia and Slovenia) 
are less restricted than in many other communist countries in Eastern Europe. They benefit 
from a vigorous Catholic press, extensive religious education programs and some charities. 
Problems remain, however. The Church must guard against atheistic and Marxist 
indoctrination in state schools, some anti-religious media propaganda regarding the church's 
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alleged misuse of religion for nationalistic and political ends, employment discrimination 
against Catholics, and efforts to divide the Church. Also of concern are a lack of access 
to radio and television, restrictions on religious practice for those in the military, and 
limitations on certain pastoral activities such as prison and hospital ministry. 
Yugoslavia's economic and pol itical crisis since President Tito's death in 1980 has 
provoked divisions and disagreements within the communist party and exacerbated tensions 
among Yugoslavia's nationalities, notably between the Orthodox · Serbs and the Muslim 
Albanians. These tensions have adversely affected church-state relations. The Church is 
not in a position to play the same role in helping to resolve these tensions as the Polish 
Church, but, as in Poland, the Church is a leader in promoting human rights and, with the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, in encouraging unity in a quite diverse Yugoslav society. 
III. A Program of Action 
A. A New Framework for Church-State Relations 
In speaking to the current dynamic of church-state relations in some detail, we seek to 
highlight the fact of the continuing denial of fundamental religious freedoms and the 
urgent need for fundamental reform in this area by the communist governments of Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union. In doing so, we seek to avoid the tendency of those, on the 
one hand, who believe that the whole story of the Church in these countries is told by the 
despicable murder of Bishop Coba and the unjustified confinement of Augustin Navratil, 
as well as those, on the other hand, who would deny or ignore the reality of these and other 
continuing attacks on basic human rights and mistake full churches for full religious 
freedom. 
This review of church-state relations in these nine countries shows important differences 
in the extent that religious practices are tolerated by the state. The context in which the 
Polish Church functions is very different than that in neighboring Czechoslovakia or 
Lithuania, and the situation in Albania has no analog in Eastern Europe. But important as 
these differences are, it is evident to us that all governments in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union share a common hostility, expressed in different ways, toward religion, and 
this hostility is reflected in repressive or restrictive state policies. 
It is also clear to us that the churches throughout this region desire and deserve the 
freedom fully to profess and practice their faith and fully to participate in the building of · 
a just and free society in conformity with the interests of the nation and the demands of the 
common good. As Pope John Paul II noted in April of this year, "That freedom which 
"Dour fellow believerso demand is rooted in the human heart ... enriching the lives of 
"Dtheo nation with the contribution of a sober, well-formed conscience, living by the values 
of the highest truth, justice, brotherhood, and peace."44 Expanded religious freedom, then, 
would benefit both believers and society; it is necessary for integral human development and 
it would contribute to the development and maturation of these societies in ways 
commensurate with their long and rich traditions. 
We are encouraged by the breezes of renewal that are beginning to blow across the Soviet 
Union and parts of Eastern Europe and pray that they will bring positive and far-reaching 
political, economic and cultural reforms. Such reforms must not be confined to these 
spheres, however, but must extend to religion as well. Progress in these other areas will be 
measured in part by the extent to which institutional guarantees of greater religious 
freedom are put into place. 
Greater religious freedom would mean a new framework of church-state relations that 
allows more than freedom of worship alone. This new framework would allow for the 
widespread dissemination of uncensored religious materials and would provide greater access 
to the media. It would mean new policies that protect parents' rights to provide formal 
religious education to their children; that end discrimination and atheistic and anti-religious 
propaganda; and that allow the formation of church groups for educational, charitable, 
cultural and social purposes. Moreover, it would allow religious bodies the freedom to 
choose, train and appoint ministers without state interference; to construct church buildings; 
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to run their own schools; to form religious orders and to control the many other dimensions 
of their corporate life. 
Such a new framework would go far in implementing the principles enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and other international 
agreements signed by the Soviet Union and all of the countries of Eastern Europe except 
Albania. These and other just demands have been expressed frequently by believers of all 
faiths in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for many years. With our Holy Father our 
"hope wells up that -- at least in th"'Deseo matters which are essential -- the longings of our 
... brothers and sisters who sincerely confess their religious faith will not be disappointed."45 
B. A Response of Solidarity by Churches, Groups and Individuals 
The fact of repression of and restrictions on religious practice in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union creates in us a responsibility and an opportunity. We must, as Pope John Paul 
II has said, "endeavor to assume an attitude of Christian solidarity with our brothers in the 
faith who are undergoing discrimination and persecution. It is also necessary to seek forms 
in which this solidarity can be expressed."46 
In the spirit of Christian solidarity, we cannot succumb to indifference, complacency or 
despair in the face of a seemingly intractable problem of religious liberty in certain 
countries and under certain political systems. What we said in The Challenge of Peace is apt: 
"Soviet behavior in some cases merits the adjective reprehensible, but the Soviet people and 
their leaders are human beings created in the image and likeness of God. To believe we are 
condemned in the future only to what has been the past of U.S.-Soviet relations is to 
underestimate both our human potential for creative diplomacy and God's action in our 
midst which can open the way to changes we could barely imagine."47 Without trivializing 
or ignoring the deep ideological antagonism toward religion that has been variously 
manifested in the Soviet Union since the 1 9 1 7  revolution and throughout Eastern Europe 
in the past 40 years, we are convinced that real progress is both possible and necessary. We 
recognize that significant progress toward religious freedom will be the result of changes 
in the internal dynamics of these countries, but we can play a role in encouraging the 
process of change. Therefore, we pledge ourselves and urge others concerned with 
promoting justice, freedom and peace to take the following actions. 
1 .  Because the promotion of human rights is required by the gospel and is central to the 
Church's ministry, we must pursue the cause of religious liberty as an essential component 
of our defense of human dignity, our option for the poor and vulnerable, and our pursuit 
of peace and justice. In doing so, we cannot forget that the lack of religious liberty is not 
a concern of Catholics or Christians only, but also of Jews, Muslims and members of all 
faiths. The ability of religious communities to voice a united advocacy for freedom, based 
on the principle that the lack of religious freedom for one is a lack of religious freedom for 
all, would be a prophetic statement and one in keeping with the ecumenical spirit of our 
times. 
2. The starting point for action on behalf of religious liberty is to inform ourselves of 
the situation of believers in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We must respond to the 
dire need for education about the complex realities of the situation. This education should 
take seriously the differences in the treatment of religion between communist countries as 
well as the common problems, and it should avoid the polemics, oversimplications and self­
righteousness which are so tempting in this area. 
3. Education must lead to action and advocacy for greater religious freedom in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, and in the many other areas of the world where it remains 
unrealized. Among the many steps that can be taken, we commit ourselves to and 
recommend the following: 
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a. Wherever possible, more East- West contacts and exchanges, especially between 
churches and believers, but also between professionals, scientists, cultural groups, 
unions and others. These exchanges can be invaluable means of sharing information, 
improving understanding, and developing trust; 
b . . The introduction of the issue of religious liberty and other human rights concerns 
into these contacts and exchanges. The need to raise these issues frankly and 
constructively becomes especially urgent precisely when these relationships are 
pursued as small steps towards improved understanding, trust and peace; 
c. Application to businesses operating in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union of 
the same norms of corporate responsibility that are used to evaluate the 
appropriateness of U.S. business presence and activities in other parts of the world; 
d. Wherever possible and to the extent feasible, financial support for the churches 
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and for the many private organizations that 
provide direct aid, such as bibles, religious literature and other materials, to these 
churches; 
e. Public and private protest against violations of religious liberty, where directed 
against individual believers or relig1on in general. 
4. Finally, and most importantly, we should continue to pray for those who suffer for 
their beliefs, recognizing our own deeply felt need for their prayers as well. We should pray 
with the confidence that Jesus has been sent "to proclaim liberty to captives and . . .  to set 
the downtrodden free" (Lk. 4: 1 8), and with the assurance that those who are persecuted for 
Christ's sake will be greatly rewarded in heaven (Lk. 6:22-23). 
C. Policy Proposals 
These individual and corporate efforts are, perhaps, the most important ways in which 
we can act in solidarity with our brothers and sisters in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. But, as concerned citizens, we cannot ignore the positive ways in which U.S. policy 
can play a role, however limited, in encouraging the expansion of religious liberty in these 
countries. 
A constant theme of our statements on matters of international justice and peace ·has been 
that human rights -- as a matter of principle and as a matter of integrity -- should play a 
prominent role in U.S. foreign policy. In giving human rights this prominence, the United 
States respects the sovereignty of other nations at the same time that it exercises its 
legitimate concern for violations of basic human dignity. We are encouraged by efforts to 
make religious liberty and human rights concerns a more integral part of U.S. relations with 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the past decade. Three dimensions of this policy 
of integrating human rights into U.S. foreign policy deserve more detailed attention. 
1. International agreements and institutions 
The Helsinki review process has provided a primary mechanism for dealing with these 
human rights concerns.48 The accords bind the signatories, which include all countries of 
Eastern Europe except Albania, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of religious belief and practice. Since the signing of the accords in 
1975, follow-up meetings have been held in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna. This review 
mechanism has encouraged the formation of independent human rights monitoring groups 
throughout the Soviet bloc, has focused international attention on human rights issues, has 
legitimized the efforts of governmental and nongovernmental organizations to raise human 
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rights concerns directly with signatory governments, and has directly linked issues of human 
rights and security in Europe. 
This dynamic, on-going process has coincided with some improvements in religious 
liberty, but the overall results have been disappointing. Despite important differences noted 
above, it is clear that none of the countries examined in this statement have upheld fully 
their obligations under the religious liberty provisions of the Helsinki accords. Rather than 
despair of the usefulness of international agreements such as the Helsinki Accords, however, 
the United States should continue to insist on full compliance with such agreements and seek 
to strengthen them. In addition to support for the Helsinki Accords, it is necessary to 
implement more fully the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, the 1 98 1  U.N. Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief and other international instruments, and to continue to support and to strengthen 
international mechanisms charged with monitoring and protecting human rights, especially 
the United Nations. In this regard, we welcome the establishment in 1 986 of a special 
rapporteur on religious intolerance under the auspices of the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission, and support his efforts to report objectively on intolerance and discrimination 
wherever they exist.49 
2. Bilateral relations 
A second aspect of U.S. policy concerns its bilateral relations with the countries of 
Eastern Europe. This statement has tried to avoid suggesting that church-state relations are 
uniformly bad and that there is no hope for improvement. The cases of Poland, the GDR 
and Yugoslavia show the possibility of a measured and differentiated use of the United 
States' influence, however limited, for improvements in religious liberty. It is too early to 
tell whether proposed reforms in the Soviet Union and throughout the Soviet bloc will 
become a reality and will include greater religious freedom. It is clear, however, that 
General Secretary Gorbachev's policies offer potentially significant changes in thought and 
practice that deserve to be taken seriously and encouraged -- not as the answer to radically 
different political philosophies and moralities and continuing East-West conflict, but as a 
potential basis for gradual expansion of freedoms in the Soviet bloc and improvements in 
East-West relations. The liberalization and the desire for improved East-West relations and 
trade in countries such as the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia 
and Hungary point to the desirability of a new assessment of U.S. policy vis-a-vis these 
countries. 
Such an assessment should consider the possibility of using affirmative measures to 
influence human rights policies and practices, including developing closer relations, 
extending credits, and encouraging cultural and educational exchanges and tourism. Such 
initiatives have the potential to contribute to incremental improvements in human rights in 
some East European countries. In all such initiatives U.S. diplomacy should make it clear 
that continued improvement in relations will depend in part on continued improvement with 
regard to religious liberty and human rights. 
3. Religious liberty and peace 
A third aspect of U.S. foreign policy involves the Soviet Union in particular and 
concerns the relationship between peace and human rights, specifically religious liberty. 
Pope John XXIII in his Encyclical Pacem in Terris put forward freedom as one of the "four 
pillars that support the house of peace."50 As Pope John Paul II has so often emphasized, 
the guarantee of religious freedom, in particular, is essential for the proper development 
of the human person, helps bring moral cohesion and the common good to individual 
societies, and contributes to the climate of mutual trust which is an indispensable condition 
for and primary expression of true social and international peace.5 1  Conversely, religious 
repression, like every form of injustice, creates deep social divisions and mistrust that 
endanger and sap the energies for peace. Moreover, it negates the positive contribution to 
the work of peace and justice that inspires all of the great religious traditions. 
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Clearly, fuller protection of religious freedoms and other human rights in the Soviet bloc 
is one of many prerequisites to the more stable, peaceful relationship between East and West 
that should be our goal. Until this basic fact is taken seriously, dialogue with Soviet bloc 
governments often will be difficult and sterile. As we said in our 1 983 pastoral letter, The 
Challenge of Peace, U.S. relations with these governments should be guided by this "cold 
realism" about the obstacles to fruitful dialogue. But this realism must be "combined with 
the conviction that political dialogue and negotiations must be pursued .. . .  Acknowledging all 
the differences between the two philosophies and political systems, the irreducible truth is 
that objective mutual interests do exist between the superpowers."52 
Therefore, we must work tirelessly, as individuals, as a Church, and as a nation for 
greater freedom and justice in countries where these are not respected. But we cannot 
ignore the necessity for continued dialogue with the governments of these countries in order 
to create possibilities for agreement in areas where concrete if limited convergence of 
interest can be found. This dialogue has led recently to progress in disarmament and U.S.­
Soviet relations. We hope and expect that it will lead to similar progress on religious liberty 
and human rights. We must pursue disarmament and improved relations in tandem with 
religious liberty and human rights. Because each has its own distinct dynamic and rationale, 
they should not be held hostage to one another, but neither should one be pursued with 
indifference to the other. Both must be pursued with vigor and perseverance, for both share 
a common aim: a more authentic and lasting peace. 
IV. Conclusion 
We have spoken here in considerable detail about infringements on religious liberty in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which are a continuing injustice and threat to peace 
and which all too often are hidden, ignored or dismissed. We have spoken as teachers and 
pastors who seek to educate about these unjust restrictions and to inspire Catholics and the 
wider society to take concrete steps of solidarity to assist the millions of believers in these 
countries who long for greater religious freedom. As preachers of the Gospel, who have 
spoken consistently on behalf of justice, peace and freedom in our own country and 
throughout the world, we have implored the governments of Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union to live up to their commitments under international covenants and to initiate a new 
framework for church-state relations so as to promote authentic human development, social 
progress and peace. 
By speaking in these ways, we ally ourselves with the bishops of Eastern Europe in their 
suffering and in their ministry to their oppressed peoples. They and their fellow Christians 
celebrate centuries of Christianity in their nations complete in the knowledge that their faith 
not only has not diminished but thrives. The celebration of these anniversaries and the 
continuing vitality of the Eastern and Western forms of Christianity are, as Pope John Paul 
II has reminded us, "above all, an incentive to turn our pastoral and ecumenical sensibilities 
from the past towards the future, to strengthen our longing for unity and to intensify our 
prayer."53 
We pray fervently for Christian unity, and we pray especially that all believers of all 
faiths soon will see the day when religious persecution and intolerance have become 
unvenerated relics of an unhappy past, anachronisms with no place in modern societies. 
Until this day dawns, we remain strengthened by the faithful witness of our brothers and 
sisters in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and we will work and pray that they soon 
will be liberated from the structures of sin which bind them. With the Holy Father we pray 
that "these brothers and sisters of ours will feel our spiritual closeness, our solidarity, and 
the comfort of our prayer. We know that their sacrifice, to the extent that it is joined to 
Christ's, bears fruits of true peace."54 
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